Creative flow as optimized processing: Evidence from brain oscillations during jazz improvisations by expert and non-expert musicians.

Using a creative production task, jazz improvisation, we tested alternative hypotheses about the flow experience: (A) that it is a state of domain-specific processing optimized by experience and characterized by minimal interference from task-negative default-mode network (DMN) activity versus (B) that it recruits domain-general task-positive DMN activity supervised by the fronto-parietal control network (FPCN) to support ideation. We recorded jazz guitarists' electroencephalograms (EEGs) while they improvised to provided chord sequences. Their flow-states were measured with the Core Flow State Scale. Flow-related neural sources were reconstructed using SPM12. Over all musicians, high-flow (relative to low-flow) improvisations were associated with transient hypofrontality. High-experience musicians' high-flow improvisations showed reduced activity in posterior DMN nodes. Low-experience musicians showed no flow-related DMN or FPCN modulation. High-experience musicians also showed modality-specific left-hemisphere flow-related activity while low-experience musicians showed modality-specific right-hemisphere flow-related deactivations. These results are consistent with the idea that creative flow represents optimized domain-specific processing enabled by extensive practice paired with reduced cognitive control.

Retrieval dynamics in resolving relational inconsistency during verbal analogical reasoning.

Reasoning about verbal analogies requires selective retrieval of relevant relational information. A consequence of this may be that inhibitory processes in memory cause reduced recall of information associated with analogy-irrelevant relations. The current experiments apply the retrieval-induced forgetting framework to investigate the potential role of such inhibitory processes in analogical reasoning. Participants studied verbal analogies in A-B :: C-D form. Then, half of the A-B pairs from the study phase appeared in verbal analogy problems but with a new C term (A-B :: C-?), and half the items did not appear in verbal analogy problems. A final recall test was then administered for all the original analogies. When the new C term in the analogical reasoning phase conveyed a new relation that was inconsistent with the original relation, reduced recall for items appearing in analogies was observed (Experiment 1). However, when the new C term conveyed a relation that was consistent with the original relation, no forgetting effect was observed (Experiment 1). This forgetting effect occurred even when a hint of the original relation was provided at final recall (Experiment 2). These results indicate that reasoning about analogies may involve inhibitory processes that help reduce competition among competing relations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Pre-stimulus brain oscillations predict insight versus analytic problem-solving in an anagram task.

There are two general strategies for solving a problem. Insight is the sudden realization of a novel idea or problem solution accompanied by an "aha" experience. Analysis occurs in a conscious, deliberate fashion without an "aha" experience. Previous research has shown that brain activity during a preparatory period immediately before a problem is presented can predict whether the subsequently presented problem will be solved by insight or by analysis. Those prior studies used a type of brief verbal problem called compound remote associates (CRA). To determine whether prestimulus activity predicts subsequent insight versus analytic solving for other types of problems, the present study used an anagram task. We examined high-density electroencephalograms (EEGs) immediately preceding the presentation of anagrams and found that during the 2-s prestimulus interval there was greater beta-band activity recorded over right central-parietal cortex prior to analytic solving compared with insightful solving. EEG source reconstruction showed that this activity originated in left mid-cingulate cortex (MCC) and the right postcentral gyrus. In contrast to prior work, we found no evidence of a significant interaction between insight-related prestimulus brain activity and positive mood, although positive mood was associated with greater activity in anterior cingulate cortex and with a larger number of insight solutions. The present MCC results suggest that participants' anagram-solving strategies may be influenced by allostasis, that is, the estimation and marshalling of neurocognitive resources required to cope with an expected task. Specifically, when a participant adequately prepares for an upcoming problem, then MCC activity is high, enabling solution by resource-intensive analytic processing. Alternatively, when preparation is insufficient for analytic processing, then MCC activity is low and subsequent solving occurs by low-demand insight processing. The current findings and explanatory model differ from those of previous studies that used a CRA task, suggesting the possibility of complex interactions between task-type and procedure-type in determining the nature of prestimulus preparation. Future research examining such interactions may yield results that benefit educators who teach students problem-solving strategies.

An insight-related neural reward signal.

Moments of insight, a phenomenon of creative cognition in which an idea suddenly emerges into awareness as an "Aha!" are often reported to be affectively positive experiences. We tested the hypothesis that problem-solving by insight is accompanied by neural reward processing. We recorded high-density EEGs while participants solved a series of anagrams. For each solution, they reported whether the answer had occurred to them as a sudden insight or whether they had derived it deliberately and incrementally (i.e., "analytically'). Afterwards, they filled out a questionnaire that measures general dispositional reward sensitivity. We computed the time-frequency representations of the EEGs for trials with insight (I) solutions and trials with analytic (A) solutions and subtracted them to obtain an I-A time-frequency representation for each electrode. Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) analyses tested for significant I-A and reward-sensitivity effects. SPM revealed the time, frequency, and scalp locations of several I â€‹> â€‹A effects. No A â€‹> â€‹I effect was observed. The primary neural correlate of insight was a burst of (I â€‹> â€‹A) gamma-band oscillatory activity over prefrontal cortex approximately 500 â€‹ms before participants pressed a button to indicate that they had solved the problem. We correlated the I-A time-frequency representation with reward sensitivity to discover insight-related effects that were modulated by reward sensitivity. This revealed a separate anterior prefrontal burst of gamma-band activity, approximately 100 â€‹ms after the primary I-A insight effect, which we interpreted to be an insight-related reward signal. This interpretation was supported by source reconstruction showing that this signal was generated in part by orbitofrontal cortex, a region associated with reward learning and hedonically pleasurable experiences such as food, positive social experiences, addictive drugs, and orgasm. These findings support the notion that for many people insight is rewarding. Additionally, these results may explain why many people choose to engage in insight-generating recreational and vocational activities such as solving puzzles, reading murder mysteries, creating inventions, or doing research. This insight-related reward signal may be a manifestation of an evolutionarily adaptive mechanism for the reinforcement of exploration, problem solving, and creative cognition.